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中国权力交接之时 (1人在浏览)

yake

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权力交接时刻,对国家而言,就好像是午夜时分最危险的时刻。在这一时刻,现任者让位给继任者,经验被不确定感取代。为保持稳定,旧时国家会强调迅速完成交接:“旧王已逝;新王万岁!”在现代民主国家,为了获得大众授权的合法性,不得不减慢交接速度。然而在今日中国,交接速度虽然缓慢,合法性却没有增加,因为中国已经没有一套被广泛接受的遴选继任者的程序。

在毛泽东时代,他可以依据自己的心愿选择或者罢免接班人。曾在党内第二的位置坐了20年的刘少奇,最终在1966年遭清洗。五年后,毛泽东钦定的继任者林彪元帅在追捕下逃出中国,因飞机坠毁死于蒙古。接着,年轻的上海造反派王洪文被直升机接到北京接替林彪,不过毛泽东很快发现他无法胜任。

最终,毛泽东选择了不起眼的华国锋,而华国锋也成功继任。然而华国锋宣誓效忠于他导师的灾难性的文化大革命政策,五年后,邓小平剥夺了他的所有职位。

作为一个“至高无上的领导人”,邓小平引入了制度创新:取消了终身制,设定了70岁的退休年龄;领导干部两届任期之后要么升职,要么卸任。然而他并未把“继任程序”制度化。和毛泽东一样,他更相信自己的判断;也和毛泽东一样,他发现自己的选择并不总是对的。1987年,胡耀邦被罢免总书记职务,原因是他放任自由化的意识形态氛围,而这种氛围鼓励了学生示威运动。1989年,赵紫阳由于天安门事件也遭遇了同样的命运。

经历了这些挫败之后,邓小平似乎不得不允许他那些年近八旬的资深同僚们(所谓的“八大元老”)帮忙选择赵紫阳的继任者。江泽民并不是邓小平的第一选择,不过邓小平还是同意赋予江泽民第三代领导集体“核心”的地位。这一“加冕”做法在1997年起到了关键作用。当时江泽民的一位高级同僚反对已年满71岁的江泽民继任总书记,硕果仅存的“八大元老”之一薄一波出面干预。薄一波表示,江泽民不应该退休,因为邓小平已宣布他是这代领导集体的“核心”,于是江泽民得以连任至2002年。

据报道,当时江泽民特别想效仿毛泽东和邓小平,为自己指定一位接班人。与他们两人不同,江泽民并没有能够确保自己历史地位的革命资历,所以他需要一位追随者来维护自己的政治遗产。但邓小平已经“钦点”曾任团中央书记处第一书记的胡锦涛为ZG第四代领导人。1992年,胡锦涛升任中央政治局常委,几乎肯定将在日后接替江泽民担任ZG中央总书记和国家主席。

以江泽民的威信,他尚不足以推翻邓小平的决定,于是他想方设法把自己上海派别的成员安排进中央政治局常委会。

胡锦涛与江泽民的不同在于,他不必为在他卸任前数年就已指定好的接班人担心,但他的威信也也不足让他可以指定自己的接班人。外界普遍认为,如果有权选择接班人,他肯定会选同为“团派”的李克强。但实际上,李克强将成为下一届中国国务院总理,而ZG中央总书记这一党内最高职位将由习近平出任。

江泽民不是“元老”,但据信他在安排习近平接班和确定新一届中央政治局常委的人选方面,发挥了关键作用。

习近平属于“太子党”。他父亲是一位“老革命”,后来又在毛泽东和邓小平时代担任高级领导职务。江泽民等退位的ZG元老们显然更倾向于太子党,因为维持现行制度也符合太子党的利益。习近平出任ZG最高领导人是派系斗争和妥协的结果,因此他个人几乎没有什么权力基础。几乎可以肯定,这正是胡锦涛及其同僚今年突然发难,扳倒另一位颇有人气的太子党、前重庆市委书记薄熙来的原因之一。如果薄熙来进入中央政治局常委会,肯定会对习近平构成真实威胁。

即便已经清理了薄熙来,政治常委会内部的派系斗争仍可能威胁到习近平的政策和地位。中国面临巨大难题,要解决它们,可能在诸多方面引发分歧。这些难题包括:由上至下的严重腐败;地方官员巧取豪夺引起的广泛抵触;环境退化;巨大的收入差距;以及资本外逃。如果习近平想做一位“密室改革家”,那么他的回旋余地非常小。ZG的8300万名党员不会希望看见一场可能危及自身权力和“小金库”的激进改革。

毛泽东领导了中国革命的胜利,这为他施行转型政策提供了合法性 ;邓小平经历了“文化大革命”的创伤,这为他启动改革和对外开放政策提供了合法性。之后,苏联垮台成了ZG的梦魇。米哈伊尔•戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)的初衷是改革GCD政权,结果却摧毁了这一政权。没有一位中国领导人能预测到,什么样的一场改革可能导致ZG政权的终结,因此他们的倾向就是把步子迈得尽量小一些。除非发生一场全国性的大灾难,习近平大概也只能混过自己的任期。

本文作者罗德里克•麦克法夸尔为哈佛大学(Harvard)政府系教授,是公认的最权威的中国文革史专家之一,代表作为三卷本《文化大革命的起源》。
 
哦哦。
 
求原文链接!

现在太多假冒玩意了,文字也是。
 
这些说法用什么外国人来告诉中国人,民间早这样说了,而且情报更精准.楼主要爆就爆些隐敝点的料来
 
QUOTE(byronroy @ 2012年11月14日 Wednesday, 01:19 PM)
求原文链接!

现在太多假冒玩意了,文字也是。
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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/780edc1a-2cbd-11...144feabdc0.html

November 12, 2012 6:59 pm

China’s new leader is hemmed in by history

By Roderick MacFarquhar

The moment of succession is the midnight of the state, a period of maximum danger, the hour when power passes from incumbent to novice, when experience gives way to uncertainty. To preserve stability, traditional states used to insist on a speedy succession: “The king is dead; long live the king.” In modern democracies, speed has been sacrificed to legitimation by popular mandate. But in China today, speed has been sacrificed, but without legitimation, for there is no longer an accepted procedure by which an heir apparent is chosen.

In Mao Zedong’s day the Chairman chose or dispensed with putative successors as he saw fit. After 20 years in the No 2 slot, Liu Shaoqi was purged in 1966. Five years later his successor, Marshal Lin Biao, was hounded into fleeing the country, dying when his plane crashed in Mongolia. The young Shanghai revolutionary Wang Hongwen was helicoptered into Beijing to take Lin’s place, but Mao soon found he was not up to the job.

Finally, Mao chose the unremarkable Hua Guofeng, who did succeed him. But Hua declared loyalty to his patron’s disastrous Cultural Revolution policies and, within five years, Deng Xiaoping was able to deprive him of all his posts.

As “paramount leader”, Deng introduced institutional innovations: no lifetime tenure, retirement at 70; up or out after two terms of office. But he did not institutionalise the succession. Like Mao, he preferred his own judgment and, like Mao, he found that his choices did not always work out. Hu Yaobang was ousted as general secretary in 1987 for permitting a lax ideological atmosphere, which had encouraged student demonstrations, and Zhao Ziyang in 1989 as a result of the Tiananmen democracy movement.

After these failures, Deng apparently had to allow his principal octogenarian colleagues C the so-called “eight immortals” C to help select Zhao’s successor. Jiang Zemin was not Deng’s first choice, but he gave him his blessing as the “core” of the third generation of leaders. This laying on of hands proved crucial when one of Mr Jiang’s senior colleagues challenged his right to continue as general secretary in 1997, because Mr Jiang was already 71. One of the last “immortals”, Bo Yibo, intervened to say that Mr Jiang should not retire because Deng had declared him the “core” of his cohort: he stayed on until 2002.

Mr Jiang was reportedly keen at that point to follow the procedure set by Mao and Deng and appoint his own successor. Unlike them he had no revolutionary laurels to assure his place in history, so he needed an acolyte to safeguard his legacy. But Deng had already blessed a leader for the fourth generation: Hu Jintao, a former Youth League chief. Mr Hu was promoted into the Politburo Standing Committee in 1992, clearly destined to succeed Mr Jiang as general secretary and president. Mr Jiang did not have the prestige to override Deng’s decision and instead manoeuvred to place members of his Shanghai faction in the PSC.

Unlike Mr Jiang, Mr Hu has not had to worry about a successor designated years earlier C but neither has he had the prestige to appoint his own. It is widely believed that he would have selected Li Keqiang, a member of his Youth League faction. Instead, Mr Li will become premier, with Xi Jinping occupying the senior post of party general secretary. Mr Jiang is no “immortal” but he is thought to have played a key role in arranging Mr Xi’s succession and the composition of the new PSC.

Mr Xi is a “princeling”, the son of a revolutionary who became a senior official of the Mao and Deng eras. Retired elders such as Mr Jiang apparently prefer princelings since they are assumed to have a stake in preserving the system. But because Mr Xi’s elevation has been a result of factional struggle and compromise, he has no personal mandate. Almost certainly that is one reason Mr Hu and his colleagues moved swiftly this year to unseat Bo Xilai, the charismatic princeling boss of Chongqing. Mr Bo could have constituted a real threat to Mr Xi had he entered the PSC.

Even absent Mr Bo, factionalism in the PSC could threaten Mr Xi’s policies and position. Solving China’s huge problems will provide ample room for disagreement: corrosive corruption from top to bottom; widespread resistance to the depredations of local officials; environmental degradation; vast income disparities; and capital flight. If Mr Xi is a closet reformer, his room for manoeuvre is small. The 83m party members did not sign up for radical changes that would threaten their power or piggy-banks.

Mao had a revolutionary victory to justify his transformative policies; Deng had the trauma of the Cultural Revolution to justify reform and opening to the outside world. Since then the party leadership has been transfixed by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Mikhail Gorbachev aimed to reform communism but he destroyed it. No Chinese leader can guess which reform might bring about the end of communism in China, so the temptation is to do little. Short of a national disaster, Mr Xi may be reduced to muddling through.

The writer is a professor of government at Harvard
 
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